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Abstract 
The essay revisits the puzzle of the ‘passage’ of time in relation to EPR-type measurements and asks what 
philosophical consequences can be drawn from them. Some argue that the lack of invariance of temporal 
order in the measurement of a space-like related EPR pair, under relativistic motion, casts serious doubts on 
the ‘reality’ of the lapse of time. Others argue that certain features of quantum mechanics establish a tensed 
theory of time – understood here as Possibilism or the growing block universe.  The paper analyzes the 
employment of frame-invariant entropic clocks in a relativistic setting and argues that tenselessness does not 
imply timelessness. But this conclusion does not support a tensed theory of time, which requires a preferred 
foliation. It is argued that the only reliable inference from the EPR example and the use of entropic clocks is an 
inference not just to a Leibnizian order of the succession of events but a frame-invariant order according to 
some selected clocks.  
Der vorliegende Aufsatz fragt, welche Konsequenzen für das Rätsel des Zeitpfeils aus der Betrachtung von 
relativistischen EPR-Paaren gezogen werden können. Die fehlende Invarianz der Zeitordnung bei raumartig 
getrennten relativistischen EPR-Paaren scheint einerseits Zweifel an der ‚Realität‘ des Zeitablaufs aufkommen 
zu lassen. Andererseits scheinen gewisse Mermale der Quantenmechanik, wie der Kollaps der Wellenfunktion, 
eine temporale Zeittheorie – hier im Sinne des Possibilismus oder des wachsenden Blockuniversums – zu 
erlauben. Der Aufsatz untersucht den Einsatz von bezugssystem-unabhängigen entropischen Uhren, bei 
relativistischen Geschwindigkeiten, und zeigt daß das Fehlen von temporalen Formen keinen Schluß auf 
Zeitlosigkeit bedeutet. Der Schluß unterstützt jedoch keine temporale Zeittheorie, die eine ausgezeichnete 
Schichtung der Ebenen der Raum-Zeit erfordert. Der Einsatz von entropischen Uhren bei relativistischen EPR-
Paaren erlaubt als einzige Folgerung eine (Leibnizsche) bezugssystem-unabhängige Zeitordnung, zufolge 
ausgewählter Uhren. 
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EPR and the ‘Passage’ of Time 
 
I. Introduction 
Over the years researchers have proposed a number of physical criteria to characterize 
temporal asymmetry in a physical sense, e.g. statistical-mechanical entropy, quantum 
measurements, the collapse of the wave-function, decoherence and the expansion of the 
universe. At the same time a debate in the metaphysics of time between Eternalism (Block 
Universe), Presentism (Moving Now) and Possibilism (fixed past, open future) has tried to 
muster the results of scientific theories (quantum mechanics, theory of relativity, 
thermodynamics) in support of these rival conceptions. According to Eternalism, past, 
present and future equally exist, while Presentism will accord existence only to the 
momentary moving Now. Possibilism requires the past to be fixed, the present moment to 
be distinguished and the future to be open. (Savitt 2001) The motion of the present Now 
constitutes temporal becoming. The significance of the present seems to imply that there 
must be a unique Now, on which all observers can agree. In the language of space-time 
physics this claim amounts to the demand of a ‘unique hyperplane’ or ‘preferred foliation’. 
These requirements also mean that the ‘passage’ of time cannot simply be a psychological 
affair – an impression of flow confined to the minds of individual observers. As space-time 
does not depend on the existence of observers, the impression of ‘flow’ must correspond to 
some passage of physical events in the real world, from which the ‘passage’ of time is 
inferred. The question to be considered is whether Possibilism is compatible with the 
measurement of relativistic EPR-pairs.1 
Whilst these discussions seem to have reached a certain stalemate, there is nevertheless 
some agreement between the opposite views. Firstly, it is agreed that philosophical 
positions should be sensitive to scientific development. (Cf. Dieks 1988; Callender 2007; 
Dorato 2006) Secondly, the opponents seem to share the assumption that these divergent 
and incompatible metaphysical positionsare deductive consequences of the respective 
                                                             
1Callender’s 2007 paper, which will be the focus of Section III, is concerned with ‘tensed theories of time’ by 
which he means the metaphysical positions of Presentism and Possibilism (or the growing block universe). 
Callender (2000, S 587) describes Presentism as picturing the ‘four-manifold as foliated via an equivalence 
relation, simultaneity, and time as the one-dimensional linearly ordered quotient set induced by simultaneity. 
Three-dimensional leaves of simultaneous events successively flash into and out of being….’. 
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scientific theories. In the present paper ‘deductive consequences’ means that they can be 
deduced from the principles of the respective theories. For instance, it follows from the 
principles of relativity that coordinate systems in relative motion with respect to each other 
may not agree on the simultaneity of events but it does not follow from these principles 
that the world is a four-dimensional static block universe. Notions like stasis or flux, 
Eternalism and Possibilism are philosophical implications of these principles. However, the 
very fact that these opposite standpoints can be inferred from scientific theories suggests 
that it may be more appropriate to regard metaphysical positions as philosophical 
consequences of scientific theories. Such a viewpoint means that they are at best 
compatible or incompatible with scientific results – and hence more or less plausible in the 
light of scientific theories.  
Whilst the above-mentioned physical criteria have been well explored in the literature with 
respect to the ‘passage’ of time, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlations in a 
relativistic context have received less attention but are equally puzzling in the quest for the 
anisotropy of time.  (See Aharonov et al.1964; 1981; 1980; Callender 2007; Penrose 1989; 
1994; 2004) The EPR correlations are a further example, as discussed in this paper, of how 
mutually incompatible philosophical consequences are inferred from relevant scientific 
theories. 
The measurement of entangled spin-½ particles from the point of view of relativistically 
moving observers  encounters the well-known problem of the relativity of simultaneity, a 
phenomenon, from which a long list of physicists had already inferred either the ‘unreality’ 
of time or at least the ‘flow’ of time along a world line, i.e. proper time. (Cf. Dieks 1988; 
Harrington 2008; Rakić 1997)  However, such inferences are often drawn without due care 
to all the factors, which should be taken into account to make reasonable statements about 
the ‘nature’ of time. It is not immediately obvious why the non-coincidence of the 
simultaneity hyperplanes of two observers, moving at relativistic speeds with respect to 
each other, should lead to the often-reached Parmenidean conclusion that time is unreal. If 
it is correct that these philosophical positions are to be inferred from scientific theories, 
then the argument should focus on physical parameters – like the behaviour of clocks or the 
measurement of spin-½ particles – without presupposing such notions as ‘becoming’, ‘stasis’ 
or Heraclitean ‘flux’ – and draw plausible conclusions regarding the nature of time from 
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such results. (Cf. Dorato 2006)  If metaphysical positions, like Eternalism and Presentism, 
Parmenidean stasis and Heraclitean flux, are merely philosophical (rather than deductive) 
consequences of scientific theories, then the relevant questions should be: a) Given 
observers, attached to inertial systems in relativistic motion with respect to each other, how 
do they register, say, the EPR correlations and b) what plausible consequences regarding the 
‘passage’ of time would they be allowed to infer? The aim of the present paper is to re-
examine the question of the ‘passage’ of time with respect to the EPR correlations in a 
relativistic setting and to take both physical and philosophical criteria into consideration; 
and in particular to draw attention to covariant and invariant relationships. The question, 
then, is what philosophical consequences regarding the lapse of time follow from this 
approach. The analysis in this paper results in the view that the EPR correlations, if 
considered from the point of view of the use of frame-invariant entropic clocks, support an 
inference to a tenseless ‘passage’ of time but that even an invariant ‘passage’ of time, as 
indicated by a pair of entropic clocks, falls short of the required criteria for a tensed theory 
of time.  
II. Quantum Measurement and the ‘Passage’ of Time 
Consider, first then, the ordinary non-relativistic case of a measurement process on an EPR 
pair. (Cf. Penrose 2004, 606; 1994, 294) In such a case only one coordinate system is 
relevant – the one in which the measurement occurs. The temporal ordering of events 
poses no problem. When the spin state of one member of the EPR pair, say +½, is measured 
the other instantaneously ‘collapses’ to -½ and a later measurement on the second member 
unambiguously finds a reduced or unentangled state.  This reduction occurs irrespective of 
the distance between them. Let two observers be space-like separated.2 Experimenter A 
performs a measurement on an EPR pair, which reduces the entangled state to an 
unentangled state. Experimenter B may be so far away from A’s laboratory that some time, 
t, elapses before B can be informed of the measurement result. B is space-like separated 
from A. A may perform a subsequent measurement on the unentangled state but B will not 
be confused about the temporal ordering of these events, as A and B are taken to be at rest 
with respect to each other. A third observer, C, also at rest with respect to A and B will 
                                                             
2
 ‘Space-like’ separation means that the observers are close enough in time but too far apart in space for finite 
signals to connect them at the moment of detection. 
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regard A’s measurement of the spin states of the EPR pair as effecting the disentanglement, 
while A, according to C, may perform a later measurement with a disentangled component 
of the pair.  (Figure I) 
 
If relativistically moving frames are brought into consideration, the agreement on the 
unique temporal succession of events is upset and encounters the ‘relative simultaneity’ 
problem. Let one experimenter, B, move at relativistic speeds, with respect to another 
experimenter, A. (Figure II) If the two experimenters are in relativistic motion with respect 
to each other, there will be disagreement about the moments of measurement and 
detection. In frame I measuring event A (measuring +½) is simultaneous with B (the jump to 
-½) but in frame II A is simultaneous with A’ and B is simultaneous with B’, so that adetector 
in frame II will experience the reduced, unentangled state at B’, which is prior to A, the 
measurement act, in frame I. This situation is often labelled a ‘paradox’ in the literature 
(Aharonov/Albert 1981; Penrose 2004; Callender 2007). What seems paradoxical is that, if 
the ‘collapse’ of the wave function is ‘real’ or at least if the detection event is real then it 
seems that it is not possible for both observers in their respective frames to be correct 
about the temporal order of events. These observers may reasonably ask themselves what 
Figure I: From the point of view of an inertial frame, the detector A registers first, 
which simultaneously reduces the state at A’, which lies outside of A’s light cone. The 
reduced state is detected later, at B, in frame II, a point, which is simultaneous with B’ 
in frame I. 
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implication this paradoxical situation has for the understanding of the lapse of time. What 
inferences regarding the nature of time are to be drawn from this version of relative 
simultaneity? It will be convenient to start with a brief review of the physics literature 
before addressing Callender’s argument, in terms of relativistic EPR pairs, against a tensed 
theory of time. This review shows that the problem is essentially due to the ‘relativity of 
simultaneity’, which also affects the EPR-correlations, but does not depend on any particular 
interpretation of the measurement process in quantum mechanics.  
 
III. What Physics says.  
According to the physics literature several conclusions can be drawn from this situation.  
1. It is a requirement of relativistic quantum field theory that the temporal ordering of 
space-like related events is irrelevant, which means that the two measurements 
commute, and that the invariant features are the joint probabilities. 
The local observables of any relativistic quantum field theory are required to commute at 
spacelike separations, and therefore the results of two spacelike-separated local 
experiments will not depend upon the order in which these experiments are carried out. 
Figure II: According to the Special 
theory of relativity the two observers, in 
frames I and II respectively, in 
relativistic motion with respect to each 
other, disagree about the temporal 
order of events. According to frame I, 
when the photon is measured at A (+½) 
its sister jumps instantaneously to -½ at 
B. The act of measurement, A, 
corresponds to A’ in frame II. According 
to frame II A’ is simultaneous with A so 
that B’, simultaneous with B, occurs 
prior to A.  According to frame II, the 
jump occurs (at B’) before the 
measurement act at A. 
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(…) If (…) each observer applies the postulate of instantaneous reduction to his own frame, 
all will nonetheless derive identical (i.e., covariant) experimental predictions for local 
observables. (Aharonov/Albert 1981, 369; italics in original) 
Similarly, Penrose states that 
(…) this kind of symmetry is a necessary feature of EPR measurements in order that they be 
consistent with the observational consequences of special relativity. Measurements that 
are performed at space-like separated events (i.e. events lying outside each other’s light 
cones (…) must necessarily commute and it is indeed immaterial which measurement is 
considered to occur ‘first’ – according to the firm principles of special relativity. (Penrose 
1994, 294-5) 
2. A consequence of the requirement that ‘local measurements must commute at space-
like separations’ (Aharonov/Albert 1980, 3322) is that, whilst ‘collapse’ along equal time 
hypersurfaces is not covariant – as the EPR case shows - , the probability distributions 
are Lorentz-covariant.  (Aharonov/Albert 1980, 3323; Aharonov/Albert 1981, 361) 
3. A further consequence, according to Aharonov and Albert, is the non-covariance of the 
state history in relativistic quantum field theories. Whilst in the non-relativistic case, a 
unique state history results from the equations of motion and the measurement act, this 
is not the case in relativistic quantum field theories. The reason for this situation is that 
‘no relativistically satisfactory version of the collapse postulate can be found.’ 
(Aharonov/Albert 1980, 3316) 
(…) it will turn out that no covariant succession of states at a given time can consistently be 
associated with the system, although the notion of a state will continue to make sense 
within a given Lorentz frame. (Aharonov/Albert 1981, 361; italics in original) 
That is, the history of a primed frame, which collapses at        , will not be a 
Lorentz-transformed version of an unprimed frame. (Aharonov/Albert 1980, 3323) 
For instance, if a free particle is prepared in a momentum eigenstate at       in 
an unprimed frame, and if at t = 0 the location of the particle is measured by 
interaction with an appropriate device, the wave-function of the particle will change 
instantaneously from a momentum eigenfunction to a position eigenfunction. But 
this change of state will not occur instantaneously in any other primed frame 
moving relativistically with respect to the unprimed frame so that ‘no covariant 
succession of states at a given time can consistently be associated with the system.’ 
According to Aharonov and Albert, observers derive covariant probabilities for both 
local and non-local observables (like total charge in a system) because the latter are 
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‘ultimately’ local ones; that is, measurements are carried out on them by ‘local 
observations on the measuring apparatus.’ (Aharonov/Albert 1981, 369; 1980, 
3322) Such claims are controversial3 but they have no further implications for the 
argument in this paper. 
In sum, relativistic field theories have the capacity to correctly predict probabilities but 
not to define covariantly the state history of relativistic systems, like the EPR case. A 
state history can be defined for the non-relativistic case but not for the relativistic case, 
although probabilities are covariant for both cases.  
If A monitors the succession of states at a given time in his own frame, this will with 
certainty confirm that the reduction process occurs along t=0, and will alter the state 
history as observed in B; and, conversely, if B monitors the state history in [frame] k’, then 
this will with certainty confirm that the reduction occurs along t’=0, and will alter the 
history as observed by A. Either of these two conflicting accounts, therefore,  can be 
confirmed by experiment, and in this sense each of them is correct; and this involves no 
contradiction, since the two different measuring procedures, whereby these two accounts 
can, respectively, be confirmed cannot both be carried out on the same system. 
(Aharonov/Albert 1981, 365; Aharonov/Albert 1980, 3321; italics in original) 
Clearly the covariance of the probability distributions, accompanied by a lack of covariance 
of a state history, does not warrant an inference to the ‘passage’ of time. Nevertheless, the 
authors observe, with respect to the radiation arrow, that ‘the nature of ensembles or 
beamsactually occurring in nature (…) is determined by the same cause as all macroscopic 
irreversibility, conceivably by the expansion of the universe’ (Aharonov et al.1964, B1416) 
or, they add,  the ‘second law of thermodynamics’ (ibidem B1410). Thus, even though there 
is a covariance of the probability distribution but no ‘covariant collapse along equal time 
hypersurfaces’ (Aharonov/Albert 1980, §iv), there is at least a de facto ‘arrow’ of time if 
appropriate criteria are taken into consideration. But this very point is often neglected in 
the philosophical literature, where the view prevails that metaphysical positions follow 
deductively from the principles of scientific theories.4 
                                                             
3Halvorson and Clifton argue that a relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) does not permit an ontology of 
localizable particles. But RQFT ‘has no trouble explaining the appearance of macroscopically well-localized 
objects, and shows that our talk of particles, though a façon de parler, has a legitimate role to play in 
empirically testing the theory.’ (Halvorson and Clifton 2002, 23; italics in original) In a later paper they show 
that Algebraic Quantum Field Theory imposes practical and theoretical limits on an experimenter’s ability to 
‘destroy entanglement between her field system [A] and [environment] B.’ (Clifton/Halvorson 2008, 5) 
4
John Earman, for instance, has offered a reformulation of McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time in 
the General theory: 
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Penrose also appeals both to the invariance of the observational results (covariant 
probabilities) and the symmetry of the temporal relation, which is‘a necessary feature of 
EPR measurements in order that they be consistent with the observational consequences of 
special relativity.’ (Penrose 1994, 388) Penrose concludes from this situation that it requires 
a new understanding of ‘reality’ in the wake of the EPR correlations.  
The joint probabilities come out the same either way but O has a different picture of 
‘reality’ from the one that I and my colleague had before. If we think of [the measurement] 
R as a real process then we seem to be in conflict with the principles of special relativity 
because there are two incompatible views as to which of us effected the reduction of the 
state and which of us observed the reduced state after reduction.’ (Penrose 2005, 606-7; 
bold in original) 
Although Penrose is in agreement with Aharonov et al. that the ‘arrow’ of time has to be 
accounted for by some other criterion, like the second law of thermodynamics, these 
discussions nevertheless reveal a certain conflation between, on the one hand, the question 
of the ‘reality’ of wave-function collapse, and, on the other hand, the puzzle of the 
anisotropy of time. Callender’s criticism of Possibilism also assumes that an understanding 
of the behaviour of the wave-function has a significant impact on the question of the lapse 
of time. 
IV. What Philosophy Says 
Craig Callender regards this mismatch of the observers’ temporal ordering of relativistic EPR 
events as a fatal blow to the ‘tensed theory of time’ (characterized as a transient Now, 
connecting the fixed past to the open future). Callender’s assessment is only the latest 
position in a long-running debate about Parmenidean stasis versus Heraclitean flux, which 
goes back to Einstein and Minkowski. (Cf. Dieks 1988, Harrington 2008; Dorato 2006; 
Weinert 2004; 2013) It follows from the relativity of simultaneity in the Special theory of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
(P1’) There must be physical change, if there is to be physical time.  
(P2’) Physical change occurs only if some genuine physical magnitude (a.k.a.‘‘observable’’) takes on different 
values at different times. 
(P3’) No genuine physical magnitude countenanced in the General theory changes over time. 
From (P2’) and (P3’) Earman arrives at his first conclusion: 
(C’) If the set of physical magnitudes countenanced in the General theory is complete, then there is no physical 
change. 
And from (P1’) and (C’) he arrives at his second conclusion: 
(C’’) Physical time as described by the General theory is unreal (Earman 2002, 5). According to Earman the 
frozen dynamic of the General theory implies the unreality of time; i.e. Earman ‘derives’ the unreality of time 
from the structure of the General theory but does not consider other criteria. 
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relativity that there exists no universal Now, since different observers judge the simultaneity 
of events according to their respective coordinate systems, which are in inertial motion with 
respect to each other. Although the clocks are invariant in each coordinate system (proper 
time), they are not invariant across different coordinate systems (co-ordinate time) and 
hence there are as many Nows as there are co-ordinate systems. But if there is no universal 
Now, there is no unique simultaneity plane and hence no unique time axis, as in classical 
mechanics. These discussions usually revolve around the compatibility or incompatibility of 
the relativity of simultaneity with a dynamic, tenseless, view of time.5 Whatever version of a 
tenseless view is adopted, Callender’s case is an attack on the belief that quantum 
mechanics ‘makes the world hospitable to a tensed theory of time’ since ‘tensers’ may still 
take refuge in some peculiar features of quantum mechanics: 1) Popper (1982, 30) argued 
that quantum non-locality required a preferred foliation of space-time to explain the Bell 
correlations; for it seems that the ‘action-at-a-distance’ between a space-like separated 
EPR-pair requires the simultaneity of the effect of a measurement on one component on its 
distant cousin; and 2) wave-function collapse seems to rescue temporal becoming. 
Callender claims that it is impossible to address the apparent conflict of non-locality and 
relative simultaneity in the absence of any interpretation of quantum mechanics. ‘The 
mechanism responsible for enforcing the space-like correlations varies with interpretation.’ 
(Callender 2007, 5) Although Callender refers to ‘fundamental’ physics, it is worth noting 
that the interpretation of what happens during ‘collapse’ is not at present part of an 
established agreed theory. The discussion in Section II has shown that this problem can be 
stated without any reference to interpretational issues of the quantum-mechanical 
measurement process. It arises because the space-like EPR-correlations are subject to the 
constraints of relativistic simultaneity. What matters is the detection of the measurement 
result, not the ‘collapse’ mechanism. 
Against the first claim Callender develops a ‘coordination problem’ for tensers: The tensers 
must claim that one frame measures before the other frame but this may not be the 
                                                             
5
Callender seems to agree with Putnam (1967) and Rietdijk (1966) that the Special theory of relativity (STR) 
supports some sort of block universe: ‘physics – and science itself – will always be against tenses because 
scientific methodology is always against superfluous pomp.’ (Callender 2007, 18; see also Callender 2000) But 
in a later paper Callender (2008) characterizes the tenseless view as one whose fundamental properties are 
the relations of precedence and simultaneity between events. This characterization reveals a much more 
Leibnizian position, according to which time is the order of succession of events. Hence tenselessness does not 
imply timelessness.  
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preferred frame according to physics or interpretational frameworks. In other words, on 
various interpretations of the quantum measurement process (Bohm’s view or the Ghirardi, 
Rimini and Weber model) the foliation does not correspond to the required metaphysics. 
The upshot is that no measurement will narrow down the preferred foliation. (Callender 
2007, 15, 16; cf. Maudlin 1996) However, the question of foliation is independent of the 
question of quantum-mechanical interpretations, since it appears in all relativistic settings. 
It needs to be differentiated according to the relativistic and non-relativistic case. As 
Maudlin (1996) reminds us notions like absolute simultaneity and absolute time order are a 
consequence of the non-relativistic case, since the underlying space-time is a Galilean (or 
neo-Newtonian) structure. In the non-relativistic case one could ‘foliate the space-time with 
space-like hyperplanes, which may be used, in essence, to define a preferred 
synchronization between widely separated systems.’ (Maudlin 1996, 294-5) The real 
problem arises when the moment of detection becomes dependent on the hyperplane from 
which the event is observed; ‘pairs, associated with different foliations, pose an entirely 
new, relativistic problem.’ (Maudlin 1996, 301; italics in original) 
With regard to the second claim, Callender also denies that ‘real’ collapse of the wave-
function justifies a notion of quantum becoming. The open/fixed distinction does not map 
neatly onto the superposition/eigenstate distinction. One may add that if wave-function 
collapse happens, it happens in particular laboratory situations, which may present a poor 
criterion for the global distinction between the fixity of the past and the openness of the 
future. It may also be recalled that the computation of the probability outcomes in the 
above EPR case is time-symmetric. 
One may have sympathy for Callender’s view not to overload the scientific base structure 
with a metaphysical superstructure. Hence it is helpful to distinguish between the 
consequences, which follow deductively from the structure of scientific theories and mere 
philosophical consequences, which follow with more or less plausibility.  
Nevertheless, tensers may not find Callender’s arguments quite compelling: 
a. Scientists and philosophers will no doubt agree that physics should explain our 
experience of the ‘flow’ of time, i.e. not only our psychological time sense but the 
intersubjective, objective lapse of time as revealed in many physical situations. Here 
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it may be possible to refer to Stein’s theorem, which defines a two-place relation, 
yRx, of y ‘having become’ with respect to space-time point, x, where R is both 
transitive (yRx and yRz) and reflexive (xRx). (Stein 1968, 15; cf. Savitt 2001, 16; 
Callender 2000) In the literature such considerations lead to notions like ‘relational 
becoming’ (Dorato 2006, §4) or chronological becoming along a world line 
(Clifton/Hogart 1996), but references to the invariance of proper time – the time 
shown by an appropriate clock along its world line - do not capture the point at issue 
here, which is the effect of relative simultaneity in the EPR case, which presumably 
prevents tensers from locating ‘passage’ in the area of quantum mechanics. The 
tensers’ notion of ‘passage’ requires some preferred foliation (or simultaneity 
hyperplane) so that a tensed theory of time should seek some covariant state 
history, as discussed below, to save the notion of (global) ‘passage’. 
b. Although Callender seems to agree with Maudlin’s warning against ‘the dangers of 
launching into investigations of Relativity before having settled basic interpretational 
problems’, (Maudlin 1996, 303-4), a different conclusion may be drawn. Given the 
apparent dependence of the mechanism of collapse on the divergent interpretations 
of the quantum-mechanical measurement process and the difficulties this poses for 
the tensers, any inferences regarding the nature of time from the wave-function 
collapse picture becomes unreliable and calls for different criteria to assess the 
question of the ‘passage’ of time, either – for instance - in terms of the foliation of 
space-time by appropriate hyperplanes or in terms of the thermodynamic features 
of appropriate clocks, as discussed below. (Recall that the physics literature cited 
above makes no reference to interpretational problems; i.e. the problem can be 
stated in terms of the relativity of simultaneity and detection events.)A physical 
mechanism may eventually be found, which explains the ‘reality’ of collapse but such 
an explanation would not single out a preferred foliation nor would it help to 
determine the measurement of the objective ‘passage’ of time. The claim that ‘there 
is a unique hyperplane advancing throughout the whole of the universe of collapse 
into eigen-ness’ (Lucas 1999, quoted in Callender 2007, 10) does not follow from 
EPR-like measurement situations, as will be discussed below.  
c. Callender does not consider other aspects of scientific theories, which may shed 
further light on which plausible consequences could be drawn from the scientific 
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problem situation, and which may be helpful to any theory, which wishes to save the 
notion of ‘passage’. Although physics allows for the covariance of the probability 
distributions, which are time- symmetric, there may nevertheless be invariant 
processes, whose existence in nature and role in scientific theories may throw some 
light on the nature of time, as hinted at by Aharonov et al. (1964) and Penrose 
(2004). 
d. In his analysis Callender does not sufficiently stress that the temporal ordering of the 
non-relativistic situation provokes no disagreement about the order of events. This 
point is, however, central in the analysis given by Aharonov et al. (1980; 1981) and 
Penrose (1989; 1994). The measurement of one member of the EPR pair 
immediately reduces the state of the other member (over large distances). A later 
measurement than encounters a reduced (unentangled) state. There is no 
disagreement about temporal ordering because at sufficiently low velocities a 
relativistic space-time world approximates a Galilean space-time structure and a 
universal Now. (Figure I) The disagreement arises from the introduction of an 
observer moving relativistically with respect to observers at rest, as discussed above. 
This discord, however, leads to a paradoxical consequence. When these observers 
move at speeds, relatively close to the speed of light (say 2/3 c), the disturbing effect 
arises. But when the same observers slow down to non-relativistic speeds and, to all 
appearances, to a classical world, the effect disappears!  The same paradox affects 
the Aharonov/Albert view about the non-covariance of a pair’s history of state. They 
claim that ‘in contrast to the nonrelativistic case, it is not possible to define the 
quantum state of a system in relativistic quantum field theories, because in this 
latter case no consistent description of how the state changes as the result of a 
measurement can be developed.’ (Aharonov/Albert 1980, 3316) But there is no 
precise boundary at which the non-covariance of the state histories arises. There is 
an even more dramatic illustration of this paradoxical situation. Penrose (1989, 260; 
cf. Savitt 2001, 10, 15) imagines two people, walking past each other in the street, 
who come to different conclusions regarding the temporal ordering of some events 
on the Andromeda galaxy. Although only slow velocities are involved their 
disagreement concerns the question whether some event A occurs earlier or later 
than some event B. But if, on a different day, the two walkers meet for a chat they 
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will find themselves in agreement as to the temporal ordering of events on the 
Andromeda galaxy. The problem is that the theory of relativity specifies no ‘phase’ 
transitions at which relativistic space-time becomes Galilean space-time; just as 
there is not precise scale at which the quantum level goes over to the classical world. 
(Cf. Penrose 1994, 308) The tenser may well conclude that this paradox of reference 
frames blocks any inference to the unreality of the lapse of time. 
It seems, so far, that questions of the temporal ordering of events, as well as the reality of 
collapse, depend on the velocity of the reference frames. Penrose, referring to the EPR-type 
experiments, concludes that ‘there is a definite conflict with the spirit of relativity in our 
picture of ‘physical reality’.’ (Penrose 1989, 370) Do these scenarios suggest, then, that the 
effects are merely perspectival? It would certainly be unwise for the two observers to jump 
to the conclusion that ‘time is unreal’, since they have not yet explored other physical 
criteria, which may throw light on the ‘passage’ of time.  
For these reasons it will be assumed (in what follows) that the observers involved in the 
relativistic EPR experiment operate behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, i.e. that they neither have 
any predetermined metaphysical views of the ‘reality’ or ‘unreality’ of time, nor any firm 
philosophical commitment to a particular interpretation of the measurement process, which 
is conventionally taken to be responsible for the reduction of the state vector.  Clearly, the 
‘reality’ of wave-function collapse or the objective ‘passage’ of time cannot be a function of 
interpretational issues in quantum mechanics. If they were, it would only reinforce the call 
for other criteria to be taken into account. How would the observers reason from behind 
such a veil of ignorance? 
V. From an invariant point of view 
When the observers come across the non-invariance of temporal ordering in the EPR 
measurements, their initial reaction may well be a Gödelian-like argument from the 
relativity of simultaneity to a denial of the objective ‘passage’ of time (or an inference to the 
block universe).  Gödel (1949) makes the assumption that time is real only if space-time 
admits of a global time function, which implies that there is an unambiguous order of 
temporal events. As there is no such unambiguous time order in the relativistic EPR events 
on the observational level (Maudlin 1996), one possible inference may well be that there is 
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no objective lapse of time in a relativistic universe.  But it is not immediately obvious why a 
disagreement about simultaneity or temporal order should lead to such drastic steps as the 
endorsement of a block universe. Before such a radical step is taken the observers should 
investigate whether there exist other physical criteria, from which inferences about the 
‘passage’ of time could be drawn. 
As already mentioned the ‘joint probabilities come out the same either way’ (Penrose 2004, 
606) but this covariance of probability outcomes cannot shed any light on the question of 
the anisotropy of time. Disagreement about the temporal order of space-like related events 
in either the relativistic or the non-relativistic case is a consequence of Minkowski space-
time so that the ‘question of which of these measurements actually comes first is not really 
physically meaningful but depends on the observer’s state of motion.’ (Penrose 1989, 371; 
italics in original) A general agreement on this perspectival conclusion seems to prevail. 
In the case of space-like connected events simultaneity between such events can only be of 
a conventional, not of a fundamental kind. (Joos 1951, 241; Weingard 1972, 119) 
Why does the problem arise in the first place? The EPR pair is space-like separated at the 
time of detection but has a common origin. (Figure I, II) What more, then, can be said about 
the disagreement about temporal order? 
As Aharonov and Albert, as well as Penrose, indicate there are other important temporal 
indicators to which the observers may appeal. It is a well-known fact that a quantum 
measurement increases the entropy of the measured system. (Schlosshauer 2008, 41; 
Aharonovet al. 1964, B1410; Penrose 2004, 822, 845) Of particular importance is the fact 
that entropy is an invariant relation, hence one on which the two observers would agree, 
irrespective of their state of motion. (Einstein 1907; Planck 1907; Eddington 1932, 101)) 
Even though the observers will disagree about the temporal order of events, they will agree 
on the increase of the entropy gradient in the measurement process at the point of 
detection.6 
Furthermore, their observational disagreement can be made to disappear if, by reducing 
their speeds, their description of temporal order can be reformulated in Galilean space-
time; hence by transformation to a different reference frame.  
                                                             
6
 Whist there are other conserved quantities like the total mass energy of a compound system or the angular 
momentum, entropy is particularly important because it is a criterion for the ‘passage’ of time. 
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As the disagreement about the temporal ordering of the EPR measurement events seems to 
be perspectival – in the sense of being a function of their state of motion - the observers 
could contemplate other criteria for the lapse of time as more reliable than the perspectival 
temporal ordering in the EPR measurement process: for instance, the expansion of the 
universe or thermodynamic processes. (Cf. Aharonov et al. 1964, B1410)   
However, Callender dismisses the tensers’ strategy to appeal to ‘cosmic times’ as a response 
to threats from the General theory of relativity: 
These cosmic times are defined in various ways, but usually they hang on various averaging 
procedures to determine the center of mass frame. The matter distribution picks out a 
preferred foliation. But why think that the psychological lapse of time or our perceived 
present marches in step with the foliation dictated by the center of mass frame? There is no 
reason to link the two. (Callender 2007, 16) 
 
Tensers will point out that the problem is not the coordination of the ‘psychological lapse of 
time’ with physical time. The problem is the objective measurement of the ‘flow’ of time or 
an objective distinction between past and future in time-orientable space-time. (Cf. 
Lehmkuhl 2012) Callender rightly stresses that physical and psychological time are separate 
issues. For instance, psychological time has neither enough regularity nor sufficient 
invariance to serve as a reliable clock. What is required of the observers in the case under 
consideration is the adoption of physical criteria, from which they can draw inferences 
about the anisotropy of time. The appeal to cosmic time seems to suggest that the 
observers could refer to one unique reference frame, as defined by a co-moving patch (a 
time slice) in the history of the universe, to settle their disagreement about the temporal 
ordering of events in the EPR experiment. The standard FLRW (Friedmann-Lemaître-
Robertson-Walker) models of the universe are equipped with an upward-pointing time axis 
(starting from the Big Bang) and each model has a ‘1-parameter family of non-intersecting 
homogeneous space-like 3-surfaces Ƭt  giving space at time t.’ (Penrose 2004, 719) The co-
moving patch, which follows the history of our observable universe, has an entropy today of 
approximately 10101, which is much larger than at earlier times. (Cf. Penrose 2004, 718; 
Carroll 2010, 334) Such a comoving patch may help to define a universal Now – a cosmic 
time - but it would hardly be suitable to serve either as a criterion for the psychological 
lapse of time or as a clock in the present case, since the observers remain attached to their 
individual frames, which leads to the puzzle of the lack of agreement about the temporal 
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ordering of events. The observers will be well advised to look for other criteria to establish 
the ordering of events.  
Could our observers make any progress by using an entropic clock? Would it lead to a 
tensed theory of time? Entropy is frame-invariant by the principles of thermodynamics. As 
increases in entropy are invariant, they do not depend on the state of motion of a particular 
reference frame. Such entropic clocks would replace the reference to cosmic time scales but 
would they give the tenser a preferred foliation of hyperplanes? 
VI. Thermodynamic Clocks 
In a thermodynamic system, moving with a relative velocity, v, with respect to another 
system, considered at rest, several thermodynamic parameters remain invariant, i.e. the 
pressure p, the number of particles N and the entropy S. (Einstein 1907; Planck 1907) 
 
000 ;; SSNNpp  . 
The question whether temperature, T, is also invariant is still controversial and at an 
experimental stage. (Weinert 2010)  If this were the case, then, to adopt Einstein’s famous 
train thought experiment, a cup of coffee drunk by a passenger on a fast-moving train would 
get neither colder nor hotter; it would have the same temperature as a cup of coffee drunk 
by a waiting passenger on a platform. If temperature were invariant, a specially constructed 
thermometer could be used by inertially moving observers at relativistic speeds to 
objectively measure the ‘passage’ of time. But relativistic thermodynamics offers other 
invariant parameters: we shall concentrate here on pressure, p, and in particular on the 
entropy, S, of thermodynamic systems. It is important to note that the lapse of time need 
not be measured by mechanical clocks, whose ticking rates are affected by relativistic 
speeds and gravitational fields, both resulting in a time dilation effect. It is equally important 
to note, for the arguments that follow, that physical time is based on physical processes. 
(Rugh/Zinknagel 2009) Such physical processes must display mathematically describable 
regularities, which are often of a periodic nature, since this periodicity helps to determine 
finite intervals of time. One problem, which arises in the Special theory of relativity is that 
clocks tick regularly in inertially moving systems, but their ticking is not invariant across such 
systems, as is revealed by the difference between proper and coordinate time. But if the 
regularities are to be invariant across different reference systems, two observers must 
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clearly agree on the length of a temporal interval and the ticking rate of clocks. This is a 
prerequisite for the objective measurement of time. As several physicists have pointed out 
(Eddington 1932; Schlegel 1968, 1977) these features are satisfied by some of the 
thermodynamic parameters, mentioned above. Consider, for instance, two properties of a 
gas clock – its pressure and entropy – both of which are invariant according to relativistic 
thermodynamics. Such a clock could consist of a two-chamber system, connected by a valve, 
as used in thermodynamics, with gas molecules at      being confined at first to, say, 
chamber A. When the valve is opened the gas molecules will, in accordance with 
thermodynamic laws, begin to fill chamber B until it reaches a final pressure, pf. First, what 
does the invariance of p mean for the measurement of time in two inertial reference 
frames? As the relationship opp  obtains, the pressure (force per unit area) is the same in 
these two systems, and independent of their respective velocities. In whichever way such 
clocks are built, the pressure measured will be the same for two observers. Hence the rate 
of change of pressure, opp  , is also the same (Schlegel 1968, 137), with the result that 
the pressure of gas clocks could be used as primitive clocks for two observers to coordinate 
activities in relativistically moving systems. When the two observers are at rest, carrying 
identical gas clocks in their respective systems, they can agree to perform a certain action, 
like an EPR-type experiment, when the pressure gauge reaches a certain value, p. What is 
important from the present point of view is that they will perform their action according to 
invariant clocks, since the proper times of the two gas clocks will agree. However, this 
agreement does not constitute a violation of the principle of relativity and does not give rise 
to a notion of ‘absolute’ simultaneity. Firstly, the gas clocks do not show the ‘correct’ time. 
They are not cosmic master clocks. They are simply two particular systems, amongst other 
clocks. Secondly, there are still as many clock times as there are reference frames. Thirdly, 
the theory of relativity forbids the choice of one particular clock as a preferred frame of 
reference, but it does not prohibit the choice of a particular type of clock as a criterion to 
draw inferences about the ‘nature’ of time.  The proposal simply exploits an invariant 
feature of relativistic thermodynamics, in the same way that ‘c’ is an invariant feature of 
Minkowski space-time. Furthermore, the pressure gauge can serve as an invariant clock in 
the two systems, and hence ‘time’ in the two gas clocks ticks at the same rate, although 
they are in inertial motion with respect to each other, and at velocities which are 
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relativistically significant. Whilst the two systems may move at high velocities, the motion of 
the gas molecules will not be affected by these relativistic speeds of the coordinate systems 
to which they are attached. And thus these observers will measure the ‘passage’ of time 
between their pre-arranged, coordinated actions, in an objective, frame-invariant manner. It 
may be called thermal time. (Cf. Rovelli 2009; Martinetti 2013) 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the consideration of entropy in relativistic systems. 
Boltzmann entropy is taken to be valid for all systems. (Carroll 2010, 284) The Lorentz-
invariance of entropy in statistical mechanics follows from the equation oNkS log . As N = 
No – so that the number of microstates, N, does not depend on the velocity of the 
thermodynamic system - we also have NkS log , and hence oSS  , where the spatial 
extension of the system in the x-direction must be kept small. It follows from this equation 
that, again, when the entropy reaches a certain state in one system, by the spreading of 
microstates into the available phase space, two observers can perform a prearranged action 
in their respective systems ‘simultaneously’ or in succession, according to their specific 
clocks. Note that the spreading of the microstates into the available phase space is a 
function of time, and this spreading of microstates into phase space occurs at the same rate. 
The spreading rate can therefore be used to define an entropy clock, . Hence observers in 
two relativistically moving systems can use the rate of spreading of the microstates, which 
according to the equation, oSS  , must be invariant, as a way of measuring the objective, 
frame-independent ‘passage’ of time, at least according to these clocks. Even the fact that 
one of the two systems, with an entropy clock ’ attached to it, must be accelerated to 
reach its relativistic velocity does not change the invariant rate of entropy increment, S , in 
the accelerated system. If we consider the velocity increase in the ’-clock as , then the 
invariance theorem can be written as   0S
d
d 

, and hence the change in velocity has no 
effect on S .  
We must take it, then, that the ’-clock while being accelerated gains the same increments 
S which comparable  clocks are gaining; if it were otherwise, entropy would not be 
independent of velocity. In the limiting case of zero velocity increments, we must also have 
the same entropy increments for the  and ’ clocks, and hence also the same increases in 
clock readings. We conclude that similar entropy clocks, in relative uniform motion, will run 
at the same rate. (Schlegel 1968, 148; cf. Schlegel 1977) 
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Once again, then, two observers who use entropy clocks will know that the invariance of S 
ensures an objective measurement of the ‘passage’ of time in their respective systems. They 
are space-like separated at the time of detection but their entropic clocks were 
synchronized at the origin. These considerations do not, of course, question the validity of 
the Lorentz transformations for entropy clocks provide no ‘preferred’ temporal frame or 
universal Now. But they show that, if relativistic thermodynamics is taken into account, new 
invariant relationships come to light, which can be exploited for the objective measurement 
of the lapse of time in relativistic systems. Hence they should turn out to be useful in the 
relativistic EPR case. 
 
VII. Consequences for a Theory of Time 
What consequences do these considerations have for a tensed theory of time? Would the 
EPR observers opt for Possibilism? Not if this view requires a universal advancing knife-edge 
or even saddle-back of Now since to make ‘one plane of simultaneity as uniquely 
metaphysically important’ (Savitt 2001, 9) is incompatible with the relativity of simultaneity.  
But the EPR observers could argue that the entropic clocks nevertheless allow an inference 
to a ‘passage’ of time, in a (modified) Leibnizian sense of the order of succession of events. 
Let us assume that the usual Leibnizian notion of passage – as the order of succession of 
events -is adapted to the requirements of relative simultaneity, and the structure of 
Minkowski space-time. The EPR experimenters’ conclusion is based on the ticking rate of 
various clocks: 
- Their respective coordinate systems record proper time. The problem is, however, 
that one observer’s proper time becomes another observer’s co-ordinate time. And 
hence there are, in Pauli’s words, as many Nows as there are reference frames. 
 
- However the discovery of frame-invariant clocks shows that the relativistic observers 
do not need to conclude that ‘the passage of time’ is a human illusion, for entropic 
clocks constitute one physical system from which the ‘passage’ of time – the 
invariant succession of chosen events in Minkowski space-time – can be inferred. 
The frame-invariant clocks tick at the same rate in all coordinate systems, in which 
they are used, and may serve as a valuable criterion for a Leibnizian succession in 
these systems, as long as they have been synchronized. Their entropic time is 
measured along the trajectory of their respective observers. 
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Callender accepts that a minimalist conception of passage is compatible with Minkowski 
space-time but he does not find it philosophically interesting. (Callender 2000) However, it is 
the only reliable inference which can be made from the relativistic setting. But it is not as 
minimalist as Stein’s relation R. It gives the tenser a partially covariant state history, at least 
according to the invariant entropic clocks. Yet, it still falls short of a universal or privileged 
present for all observers, since invariant entropic clocks cannot avoid the constraints of 
relative simultaneity. 
Referring back to Figure II, assume that in frames I and II identical, synchronized entropic 
clocks are used to measure the respective proper times. In frame I A and B must have the 
same entropy value, whilst an earlier event, located at  B’, has a lower value in frame I. 
Frame II must judge the event at B’ to have a lower entropy value than A (or A’) even though 
B and B’ are simultaneous for frame II. Thus the tenser can derive a frame-invariant 
succession of events for the space-like separated observers, but no frame-invariant Now. 
This result is already well established for time-like related events. (Weinert 2004, Ch. 4.4) 
 
What the EPR observers can conclude, with some confidence, is that the usual identification 
of tenselessness with changelessness (cf. Callender 2000, S587) is mistaken, since there is a 
Leibnizian order of the succession of events, which, at least according to the entropic clocks 
is invariant across their reference frames. However, as has been argued, the existence of 
such invariant entropic clocks does not justify an inference to a universal Now, which seems 
to be required by a tensed theory of time. They are not master clocks but the invariant 
ticking of some appropriate clocks, may, in the footsteps of Leibnizian relationism about 
time, be enough to infer that even in a relativistic universe there is a ‘passage’ of time; past, 
present and future are not equally real, contrary to the assertions of the Block theorist. 
The EPR observers are free to go further and view the four-dimensional world dynamically 
as a series of branching events, in which the future consists of a history of many branches, 
which are equally possible but not equally probable, with the present moving stochastically 
up the branching tree. If they endorse this view they enter some well-rehearsed debates: 
whether the Special theory of relativity is (or is not) compatible with probabilism (cf. 
Maxwell 1985; Dieks 1988) and what prospects there exists for Presentism in space-time 
theories. (Cf. Philosophy of Science 67, 2000, Supplement). For present purposes it must be 
concluded that the use of entropic clocks does not deliver the central item, which a tensed 
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theory of time requires: a preferred foliation. It does, however, deliver one criterion to 
which the tenser may appeal to show that a frame-invariant succession of events is possible, 
at least as established by a pair of entropic clocks. 
In the face of the difficulties which EPR seems to represent for the temporal ordering of 
events, R. Penrose calls for a new worldview. (Penrose 1994, §7.12; Penrose 1989, 480) 
Others seek refuge in the time-invariance of physical laws and seem to accept, as a 
consequence, the block universe. It seems to the present author that the EPR case does not 
justify such conclusions. The observers disagree about the simultaneity of the detection 
event to the extent that in one frame collapse appears to occur before measurement. But 
there is no disagreement about entropic gradients, due to the invariance of entropy, S. The 
use of entropic clocks can be compared to the idea of cosmic time – or an arrow of time –
since the use of these clocks eschews the disagreement about the temporal order of events 
(at least between observers using entropic clocks). But in accordance with the principle of 
relativity it is to be expected that the employment of entropic clocks throws up a new puzzle 
about time: the observers now have to deal with different clocks whose clock times do not 
all agree. The observers’ ‘normal’ clock would suffer the usual time dilation effects and lead 
to disagreement about the ordering of the EPR events. But the existence of entropic clocks 
will lead the observer to conclude that their disagreement, according to their mechanical 
clocks, may be due to perspectival effects, caused by their respective velocities just as the 
appearance of length-contracted objects in the Special theory of relativity has been 
interpreted as a perspectival effect. (Weisskopf 1960)  Entropy clocks are not master clocks 
but they are frame-invariant and are not subject to the above-mentioned paradox of slow 
motion. They constitute a different criterion to make inferences about the dynamic ‘nature’ 
of time, rather than the block universe. The use of entropy clocks shows that observers do 
not need to conclude that the lapse of time is a human illusion. The ‘passage’ of time is a 
philosophical inference from given criteria. These criteria must be well-chosen but reliance 
on relativistic simultaneity may not be the best policy.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
Callender is right that tensers cannot draw their conclusions about the ‘flow’ of time from 
quantum mechanics, not because it has been shown that there is no physical ‘passage’ of 
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time but because EPR-type experiments in a relativistic context pose the difficulties of 
temporal order. But an inference to a Putnam-style block universe is as little justified as the 
tenser’s conclusion about a universal Now. From the consideration of entropic clocks the 
detenser can infer that a tenseless view is characterized by precedence and simultaneity but 
no privileged Now. The tenser may conclude that there is a ‘passage’ of time and that some 
appropriately chosen clocks, indicating entropic gradients, may deliver a covariant history of 
specific events.  
Callender’s attack on tensed theories of time, in the context of appropriate scientific 
theories, indirectly confirms the thesis at the beginning of this paper that metaphysical 
positions, like Eternalism and Possibilism, are merely philosophical consequences, with 
differential claims to plausibility. As the only reliable inference from a consideration of the 
EPR correlations is a modified Leibnizian sense of ‘passage’ – as the invariant order of 
specific successive events in space-time, according to appropriate clocks – further 
inferences to the Parmenidean block universe or Heraclitean flux are necessarily empirically 
underdetermined. A consequence of the considerations in this paper is that such debates 
will remain unresolved because of their empirical underdetermination.  
On the other hand, the establishment of temporal ‘passage’ at which this paper arrived 
through a reflection on entropic clocks, shows that whilst certain features of physical 
theories do not support inferences about the ‘flow’ of time others decidedly do. But this 
situation need not end in deadlock. If all the temporally relevant features are taken into 
account – the laws of statistical mechanics, Liouville’s theorem and the topology of phase 
space, the expansion of the universe, the preponderance of outgoing radiation, the 
measurement process and decoherence – the inference to the anisotropy of time is more 
plausible than the inference to the block universe. The observers should trust their entropic 
rather than their mechanical clocks. 
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